Part 1 - Agnipath Controversy – Need for a Balanced Perspective

Conceptually, the idea behind the “Agnipath Scheme” to develop “Young Fighting-Fit” Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen is sound. However, “Nuts and Bolts” formulation and implementation needs a ‘De Novo” review after taking into consideration “redundancy” in many areas.

Political leaders who are clueless about military affairs and least concerned with national security interests are demanding scrapping the Agnipath Scheme. While Rahul Gandhi wants to scrap the scheme fully, recently two former Navy chiefs (Arun Prakash and Karambir Singh) stated that economics to reduce the pension bill should not be the sole consideration.

By contrast, there are other senior veterans who welcome Agnipath as the need of the Indian armed forces – army, air force and navy. They want youngsters in the battle ground to thwart the enemies. However, they express their apprehensions over the effective implementation of the scheme particularly at the entry and training level.

Undeniably absurd it is to demand restoration of the “Recruiting System” to the status quo ante. What must be done is intra-Service in depth review keeping in view specific requirements for combat capabilities to wage high-tech wars.

It must be accepted by all alike that the Armed Forces must not be viewed as an organization for offering jobs for all and sundry and retaining them on par with the civilian babus to retire at 58 or 60. In any case, the armed forces are not an employment generation scheme or welfare organizations. They are meant for war where the option is not for the second best.

Critics must read Norman F. Dixon’s Book (1970) “On psychology of Military Incompetence”. This unique and penetrating book surveys 100 years of military inefficiency from the Crimean War, through the Boer conflict, to the disastrous campaigns of the First World War and the calamities of the Second. Military incompetence refers to incompetencies and failures of military organizations, whether through incompetent individuals or through a flawed institutional culture.

Furthermore, promotions based on seniority, populist welfare measures, are simply ridiculous in today’s dynamic high-tech battlefield scenarios. After all, skill sets alter rapidly. Those persons possessing rapid adaptation qualities can effectively deliver in high-tech battlefields. What does it imply? The answer is simple. Meritocracy must be the sole criteria to either retain or promote personnel to higher ranks. If so, those who are found unsuitable for the next grade should also be given opportunities to seek voluntary discharge if they so desire at 10 or 15 or 20 years of service whichever is applicable to them.

There are five issues that need to be considered whilst reviewing the Agnipath Scheme to include: 1) Changes to existing Recruiting System; 2) Forces levels particularly TOOTH to TAIL ratios; 3) Out of Box alternative for Lateral induction; 4) 4 years tenure and 25 percent retention; and 5) Compensation, financial assistance packages and other welfare measure to be on par with others.

Long overdue is “Reforms in Recruiting System of the Armed Forces". Just as future wars cannot be fought using tactics that worked in previous wars, even the human resources required to be fighting fit are physically, mentally robust and high-tech savvy. In fact, reforms to the existing “Recruiting System” are extraordinarily complex and overdue.

None must forget the lesson of 1962 War – physically unfit units surrendered during the withdrawal. The changes that were made post-1962 enhanced the combat capabilities that enabled the battles to be won in 1965 and 1971 – particularly fighting fit soldiers led by unit commanders with 14-16 years service, brigade commanders with 20-22 years and Generals Commanding Divisions aged over 44 years. Units could cover over 32 kilometers during hours of darkness self contained for seven days.

Undeniably, gone are the bygone days when personnel got enrolled with Class 5 minimum educational qualification during World War II and even thereafter, mostly robust rural personnel. Today, most of the enrolled personnel are from “Urban” areas brought up in “White Light” environment.

Admittedly, the “Soldiers of the Fighting Arms of the Army” must be young and fighting fit to wage battles in varying terrain configurations – from plains, deserts, semi deserts, canal-cum-DCB areas, hills, mountains, High Altitude and Terrestrial Areas - to endure the rigors of waging battles for short duration extending over 14-20 days and also for long duration.

What does “Young Fighting Fit” personnel requirement imply to wage unfolding high-tech wars? It mandates a clean break from the post-World War II archaic “Recruiting System”. There is a need to define qualitative requirements (QRs) of human resources separately for Army, Navy and Air Force. In turn, each Service needs to determine the QRs for each arm/wing/trade to wage high-tech wars.

For example, the QRs of personnel for “Fighting Arms – Infantry, Armor, Artillery and Engineers” are different from Logistic Support Services of the Army. The QRs (physical, mental and technical) vary considerably. If an infantry battalion is medically screened from the plains before induction in High Altitude and Terrestrial Areas, at least 25 to 25 percent of personnel may be found medically unfit. How can one expect to fight the Chinese PLA descending from 14,800 feet high Tibetan Plateau?

What does it imply? No uniform thumb rule must be used for screening and selection of new entrants. Specific criteria must be identified and defined, particularly for each fighting/combat arm. Common Sense dictates that only physically fit Soldiers, JCOs and Officers who can withstand mentally the rigors of waging battles in hostile terrain configurations are retained in service instead of following extended periods of service on welfare criteria or to reduce pension bill.

Thus, the need for each Service (Army, Navy and Air Force) and Arms within them to carry out a de novo review of QRs of human resources. In particular, the demand for personnel with requisite technical skills and talent is to man technical assignments in strategic and tactical missile units, aerospace forces and cyber specialists. Even technicians in the Air Force and on board the Naval Ships differ from the technical capabilities of other arms. Training them to acquire requisite technical expertise in the current recruiting system extends over a number of years. Such personnel cannot be easily released in short term time frames having given them specialist technical capabilities.

Is there an alternative? In retrospect, alternate recruiting options are available due to educational institutions offering technical engineering fields. For example, there are over 184 private and 20 government colleges that offer aeronautical engineering: both undergraduate (B.Tech) and postgraduate programs (M.Tech). Similarly, there are 72 Marine Engineering Colleges of which 51 private and 21 government colleges in India which offer Marine Engineering courses. Add to them, a total of 5868 engineering and technology institutions providing a vast technical pool in a variety of fields.

With such a vast pool of technically qualified personnel available, the recruiting system must undergo revolutionary changes, not merely cosmetic changes. Even the armed forces need to shift the focus away from mass recruitments to a mix of specialists and a smaller contingent of regular foot-soldiers. Surely, direct recruitment of technically competent persons at Junior Commissioned Officers or equivalent levels needs to be exercised. At the same time, the chances for growth from Airmen, Sailors and Soldiers must remain open.

Need for Holistic Review

Having established the need for reform in the current “Recruiting System” in Part 1, let me provide a holistic perspective on other 4 key issues.

Facts of the TEETH to TAIL ratio of the Army! Total Strength of Armed Forces (14,74,945): Army - 12,37,117; Navy - 67,252; Air Force - 170,576. And, the Indian Army has a variety of combat units that require separate skill sets to include: Infantry Battalions - over 400; Armor Regiments - 68 including PBG; 27+21 Mechanized Infantry Units; Artillery units - 253 plus 56 AD units, 44 radar and SATA units/btys; over 70 Combat Engineer units. Similarly the Navy and the Air Force have a variety of units.

A macro level perspective of TEETH includes: Army has 37 divisions grouped under 13 Corps. Considering on an average, there are 15000 personnel per division, total works out to 5,55,000. Add to them, around 5000 personnel per Corps, total additional works out to 65,000 personnel. That makes the total of TEETH to 6,20,000 personnel.

If so, the TAIL consisting of all and sundry is over 6,17,000 personnel. Surely, there is scope for identifying redundancy even after recent closure of Military Farms, Ordnance Depots among others. And, the size of the army in numbers must be reduced without affecting the TEETH.

Next, 400,000 defence civilians are under the MOD. As per data in public domain, 36 percent of Defence pension bill of ₹54,500 crore in 2023 is on account of defence civilians. For political compulsions, the issue of redundancy of defence civilians is barely ever considered.

“Tail wags the Dog” is, therefore, quite appropriate. No discussion on “Tooth to Tail Ratio” at all levels to include defense civilians. Why continue with the archaic policy of direct recruitment of civilians? Surely, the MoD must first review the policy of recruitment of civilians, particularly vacancies arising annually, and opt for “lateral induction from the unfit servicemen to fight.

Holistically viewed, the overall numbers of armed forces, therefore, need downsizing. At the same time, the quality of recruits needs to be upgraded to work more with technology and sophisticated equipment, even robots. This cannot happen if the old recruitment process continues, which can constrict the resources available for buying hardware and software, and for recruiting more specialists in areas like cyber warfare, use of drones, and war robots. Recruiting shortages in skill sets ultimately result in capability shortages in combat. Updating personnel systems and career paths must ensure the Indian military recruits to acquire the capabilities needed for the 21st century.

Yet another controversial issue concerns 4-years tenure for Agniveers and 25% retention. There are suggestions by some officers to increase the tenure to 7-years and retention 50%. On face value, the suggestions appear quite sound which may be reconsidered by present military hierarchy. Furthermore, there is also demand to increase the upper age limit for Agniveers from 21 to 23 years. In retrospect, an increase in the upper age limit is patently wrong if one wants a Young Fighting Fit army. For officers' entry, there are different age limits for NDA, IMA (Graduate, NCC, ACC, TG) and TES entry’s. Can a similar age criteria be prescribed for Agniveer for specialist trades?

Even the issue of “Lateral Induction” of Agniveer and others seeking discharge for a variety of reasons needs de novo review. “Out of Box '' thinking is an imperative. Why not stop enrolling recruits for “Non-Fighting Arms (MES, AMC, ASC, AOC, CMP and others) and laterally induct those not found fighting-fit within their establishments? In today’s context of capabilities of human resources, it is very easy for them to reorient themselves to requirements of support services. Also, pass laws or Rules for "Lateral Induction" into BSF and Central Para Military Forces? Why not also in all State Police Forces?

Yet another issue making media headlines is administrative issues like financial assistance for Agniveer killed in the line of duty and the anomalies in the current system of compensation. For example, some benefits are exclusive to regular soldiers like gratuity and monthly family pension. Their pensions are revised as per the system of One Rank One Pay (OROP) and Pay Commission recommendations. Children of soldiers who die due to operational reasons are eligible for a children’s education allowance which is equal to the cost of school/college fees and books till graduation. Transportation, hostel charges, and uniform costs are also included. For other than battle casualties, an educational scholarship varying from Rs 10,000 per annum for Class 1 to Rs 50,000 per annum for professional courses is given. Wives of such soldiers are also entitled to Rs 20,000-50,000 per annum for graduation and professional courses. Their families are entitled to benefits of the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) to provide medical care.

Undeniably, the "Blind men of Hindustan - political masters and bureaucracy" who presided over the system in the last 50 years are squarely responsible for the present absurd state of affairs. Even the senior hierarchy of Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals are also squarely responsible for the present status. They were mostly silent bystanders on the need for reforms at all levels. None of them thumped the tables for demanding the implementation of "Lateral Induction" to Central Para Military Forces and other Police Forces or demanding enhancement offer of the "Golden Handshake".

In 2019, the Army gave its approval to extend the services of soldiers by two years and began a study to work out another phase-wise formula to retain trained manpower for a longer period. Also, an all-encompassing study was launched to identify arms and services in which soldiers can be retained for a longer period that failed to see the light of the day. “It takes a minimum of three years to train a soldier. We allow him to leave once he achieves proficiency in his stream. The aim is to retain trained manpower,” one officer said then.

In retrospect, the Agnipath scheme may be viewed, therefore, as the early stage of the reform process that must go through modifications based on accumulated wisdom of past wars/conflicts and future trends. The scheme is intended to provide opportunity for youth to fulfill the dream of joining the armed forces to serve the nation, imbibe military discipline, skills, physical fitness, confident and better citizens, offer good financial package and 100 percent opportunity for permanent enrolment.

Remember that militaries world over have ideas about what kind of wars they’re likely to fight, how they plan to fight them, and the best way to balance capability, capacity, and readiness. Conventional wars often come down to attrition, where manpower and materiel matters more over time than many other elements. Their core choices are not driven by an attempt to balance resources and attain force flexibility, but also by a coherent set of beliefs about how the armed forces should organize to fight adversaries. There are clear problems with competence, scaled-up employment, and integration.

Viewed pragmatically, demand of higher pensions and other compensatory issues justifying restoration of status quo ante of the recruiting system is patently absurd.

To sum up, no longer the armed forces can delay the introduction of reforms in the recruiting system and induction training syllabi. The changes that were made post-1962 enhanced the combat capabilities that enabled the battles to be won in 1965 and 1971. When successive governments failed to implement the demand of the armed forces for "Lateral Induction", extension of service tenures mostly as a welfare measure, were implemented. However, the "New War Fighting Environment" demands technical expertise of far more complex nature than ever before. With rapid pace of combat systems technology obsolescence, there is a dire need to implement reforms holistically in the human resources management – recruitment, induction training, skill set up gradation, graded release processes based on meritocracy and rehabilitation to include post-retirement compensations.

Considering the complexity of the problem, the MoD may like to direct the three Services to constitute Committees separately and submit their recommendations. Even the MoD may like to constitute a Committee to enquire into drastic “Downsizing” of Defense Civilians besides identifying “Lateral Induction Opportunities” under its ambit.