OPERATION SINDOORA TACTICAL WIN FOR INDIA, OR AN INCOMPLETE LESSON FOR PAKISTAN



OPERATION SINDOOR
A TACTICAL WIN FOR INDIA, OR AN INCOMPLETE LESSON FOR PAKISTAN

The recent flare-up between India and Pakistan, culminating in Operation Sindoor, has rekindled global attention on one of South Asia’s most volatile fault lines. Launched in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025—which left 28 civilians dead—India's Operation Sindoor was a swift and calculated military response aimed at crippling terror infrastructure allegedly operating across the border. While New Delhi has declared the operation a success, the broader question remains: Is this a lasting strategic victory, or merely an incomplete lesson for Pakistan?
This matter warrants serious investigation, and India should thoroughly examine who is working behind the scenes to initiate this conflict. We cannot rule out the possible involvement of China, the United States, Palestine, or Hamas in this issue. I am confident that the National Investigation Agency (NIA) is conducting its operations diligently and will identify those who are opposed to our country's economic development.
At times, those who claim to resolve international conflicts are, in fact, the ones escalating them from behind the scenes. We have seen how the United States suddenly intervened between India and Pakistan to neutralize potential war-like situations, even though U.S. Vice President JD Vance stated on May 8, 2025, that the U.S. would not intervene in the India-Pakistan conflict, saying, "None of our business."
Surprisingly, the U.S. Vice President’s stance differed from that of other top American officials, including the President and the Foreign Minister. We must critically evaluate the perspectives of those who appear to be neutral but may not truly be. It is easier to respond when adversaries and their allies are clearly visible—as is the case with Turkey and China openly supporting Pakistan, while Israel and Russia stand with India.
Another perspective on this ceasefire that has come to my attention—after repeated reports from several national and international media outlets—is that Pakistan experienced two earthquakes of 4.0 to 4.6 magnitude following India’s attack on the Nur Khan Airbase and Kirana Hills, which are believed to be nuclear facilities. Subsequently, U.S. and Egyptian planes carrying boron were reportedly spotted in Pakistan to check for radio activity. Might this be a potential reason for the United States' mediation?
Derek Grossman, Senior Defence Analyst, RAND corporation” states that; 
  ‘Indian forces threatened Pakistani nuclear command and control damaged a facility there that now may be leaking radioactivity. Hard to exaggerate just how dangerous the situation had become prior to US- brokered ceasefire. 
Apart from this nuclear threat in the region of Pakistan, I have another important issue that I would like to address. We must also examine the ongoing demographic shifts occurring within several regions of India. There are reportedly millions of illegal migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh currently residing in the country. For too long, we have turned a blind eye to concerning developments such as the “Friday fear,” stone-pelting mobs, illegal constructions, on-ground workers (OGWs), sleeper cells, and the strategic use of victimhood narratives.
At the same time, a small section of Indian Muslims, whose actions create disruption and unrest, must realize that their anti-national behaviour can lead to consequences for the broader community. India is your country as much as anyone else's, and standing united with the nation in all circumstances is essential. Similarly, Hindus must recognize that not all individuals wearing religious caps are aligned with anti-national elements. Generalizing or stereotyping is counterproductive.
Figures like Mulla Muneer and others in Pakistan aim to incite Hindu-Muslim conflict within India. They have already turned their own country into a state associated with terrorism in the eyes of the global community and have depended on foreign aid, particularly from the U.S. and other allies, since 1947.
Coming back to the topic, The Pahalgam attack was not the first instance of cross-border terrorism, but its scale and brutality struck a raw nerve across India. Public outrage, political pressure, and rising security concerns catalysed the Indian government’s decision to respond with force. Intelligence sources reportedly traced the attack to operatives linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, with bases in Pakistan-occupied territories.
In the days following the attack, India opted for a covert–overt hybrid strategy—officially unacknowledged initially but evident in action.
Operation Sindoor, executed over a span of 72 hours, targeted nine key terrorist facilities, including training camps, launchpads, and weapons depots. These strikes were conducted using a mix of precision-guided munitions, drones, and special forces operations, minimizing collateral damage and maximizing tactical surprise. The operation reportedly involved coordinated strikes in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, as well as deeper penetrations across the Line of Control (LoC). The Indian military establishment hailed the mission as a tactical success, citing high-value target neutralization and minimal Indian casualties but the question is: is it sufficient to stop or deter cross-border terrorism? History says no—it is not sufficient. So, what measures should India take to cripple these terror attacks in the long term? Should it be the complete capture of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), the neutralization of key terrorist organizations, or the neutralization of Pakistan as a whole—a country that the U.S. and China appear to be protecting for their own future interests?
Country like Pakistan who predictably denied the presence of terrorist infrastructure on its soil and accused India of violating international norms and the LoC ceasefire. However, the diplomatic isolation Pakistan faced in the immediate aftermath—with key global powers urging de-escalation while tacitly acknowledging India’s right to self-defence—underscored shifting global attitudes toward terrorism But some of them are using terrorism for their own political and geopolitical interests. As admitted by Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, “we supported terrorist groups for the last three decades.” However, he conveniently forgot to add another 48 years. In my opinion, they have been nurturing terrorism since 1947.
Despite this, Pakistan did not show signs of reining in proxy actors. Skirmishes resumed along the LoC within days of the ceasefire, raising concerns about the durability of the deterrence Operation Sindoor aimed to establish.
From a Indian defence standpoint, Operation Sindoor achieved its immediate goals:
Demonstrated India's enhanced intelligence and strike capability.
Sent a strong message to terror groups and their sponsors.
Boosted domestic confidence in the Indian military's preparedness.
However, whether it marks a strategic turning point remains debatable. Pakistan's deep state nexus with non-state actors remains intact. The lack of political will in Islamabad to dismantle these groups continues to pose a threat to long-term peace. In that sense, the operation might end up being yet another warning—like the 2016 surgical strikes or the 2019 Balakot airstrikes—that Pakistan temporarily heeds but ultimately dismisses.
India’s assertive stance reflects a new doctrine of proactive engagement. However, long-term peace and deterrence will not come from operations alone. A multi-pronged strategy involving diplomatic isolation of Pakistan, internal security strengthening, and international cooperation on counter-terrorism is essential.
Moreover, sustained pressure on Pakistan to act against terror groups from within—via forums like FATF and the UN—must accompany military actions.
Operation Sindoor was undeniably a tactical victory—bold, swift, and precise. But if Pakistan continues its old playbook of denial and proxy warfare, it may soon forget the sting. For lasting impact, India must ensure that Sindoor is remembered not just as a strike, but as the beginning of a broader, unrelenting policy of deterrence.
Only then can such operations move from being episodic responses to part of a larger narrative that finally teaches Pakistan the full weight of its misadventures.
Amritansh Mishra
Professor 
Invertis University
Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh , India






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