Understanding realities of “PLA Army Force Levels, Capabilities
and intent” opposite Ladakh is critical to assess and determine likely “War
Scenarios” based on military strategies to conduct operations; and their intent
in short, mid and long term contexts. To assess full PLA capabilities, even the
PLA Air Force and PLA Strategic Rocket Forces capabilities needs to be reviewed
to reach final assessments.
PLA military reforms started in 2015
transformed the Apex force structures. In particular, the Western Theater
Command (WTC) was created responsible for the
Indo-Tibet border (Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh) by two Military Regions
(MR) merger - Chengdu MR and the Lanzhou MR – and also for internal security in
Tibet and Xinjiang.
Pre Reforms
Status in 2017: Pre 2017, there were 2 MRs covering the
present Western Theater Command: the Lanzhou MR;
and the Chengdu MR. Post 2017, both MRs have been merged to form the WTC. The
Xinjiang Military District functions directly placed under PLAA command. Most
significantly, Post 2017, as per Chinese media reports, the Tibet Military
Command/Military District has been elevated and placed under the PLA Army
(PLAA).
Lanzhou
MR Responsibility Force Level Pre
2017: Responsible for Ladakh besides
Xinjiang operations and Kazakhstan border, consisted of the following
formations:
·
21st
Group Army:
61st Motorized Infantry Division; 12th Armored Brigade; Artillery Brigade; Air
Defense Brigade; 'Tiger' Special Operations Dadui.
·
47th
Group Army:
55th Motorized Infantry Brigade; 56th Motorized Infantry Brigade; 139th
Mechanized Infantry Brigade; 9th Armored Brigade; 1st Artillery Brigade;
Anti-Aircraft Brigade; Communications Regiment; and Engineer Regiment; 3rd Army
Aviation Brigade. 12th Artillery Division was previously with 47th Group Army.
·
Xinjiang
Military District (HQ Urumqi):
4th Motorized Infantry Division (Kuqa); 6th Mechanized Infantry Division
(Kashgar); 8th Motorized Infantry Division; 11th Motorized Infantry Division
(Urumqi); Special Operations Brigade; 3rd Army Aviation Brigade; 2nd Artillery
Brigade; Air Defense Brigade; 1st Independent Infantry Regiment; 9th Engineer
Regiment; Signal Regiment; Electronic Warfare Regiment; 31st Chemical Defense
Regiment.
·
63rd Armed Police Mobile
Division (Pingliang) (formerly 21 Army 63 Division); and 7th Armed Police
Mobile Division (formerly Xinjiang District 7th Division).
Lanzhou
MR Force
Levels Post Modernization 2017: 21 and 47 Army Army’s have been
merged to form 76th Army Group with the Divisions/Brigades
restructured as Combined Arms Brigades as given below:
·
76th Group
Army (Xining City, Qinghai Province):
17th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade; 56th Light Combined-Arms Brigade; 62nd
Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade; 149th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade; 182nd Light
Combined-Arms Brigade; 76th Special Operations Brigade; 76th Army Air Force
Brigade; 76th Artillery Brigade; 76th Air Defense Brigade; 76th Brigade of
Engineering Chemical Prevention; 76th Service Support Brigade.
·
Xinjiang
Military District (HQ Urumqi): 4th Motorized Infantry
Division (Kuqa); 6th Mechanized Infantry Division (Kashgar); 8th Motorized
Infantry Division; 11th Motorized Infantry Division (Urumqi); Special
Operations Brigade; 3rd Army Aviation Brigade; 2nd Artillery Brigade; Air Defense
Brigade; 1st Independent Infantry Regiment; 9th Engineer Regiment; Signal
Regiment; Electronic Warfare Regiment; 31st Chemical Defense Regiment; and 363
BDR.
·
63rd Armed Police Mobile
Division and 7th Armed Police Mobile Division.
·
Hotan
Most important to note
that the Infantry Divisions in the Xinjiang
Military District have been modernized as Mechanized and Motorized Divisions as
terrain favors mobile warfare.
As per US intelligence expert estimate, the total Ground Forces
in the WTC includes: 76 & 77 Army Groups
and additional forces - 90,000–120,000; Xinjiang Military District -
70,000; and Tibet Military District 40,000, that is, total 200,000–230,000.
5 Likely war scenarios: Nuclear War; Two Front
Conventional War; Ladakh Front Conventional War jointly with or without
Pakistan; Limited War to secure all disputed areas of LAC; and Joint
Fire Strike Campaign (JFSC).
Nuclear war is ruled out
in today’s context. So also, Two Front Conventional War is unlikely.
Possibility is most likely for Limited War to secure all disputed areas of LAC
and also JFSC campaign based on the recent border skirmishes in
Eastern Ladakh and Doklam in 2017 and PLAs de-escalation/disengagement.
Most importantly, all WCT formations/units
are trained to conduct offensive and defensive operations in isolated
high-altitude areas with difficult terrain and weather conditions. PLA recognizes that ground combat will occur mainly
along roads that normally follow valleys or ridges, limiting support and
cooperation between forces operating on different axes. Lack of cross-terrain
mobility limits the ability of ground forces to conduct penetrating or
outflanking operations against enemy forces. The Stride, Joint Action and
Firepower training focuses on movement long distances by multiple means to
reinforce another region and engage in combat. Also, stress is on airmobile
landings in the enemy rear areas.
At the Operational Art
level, formations/units are trained to conduct limited Mountain Offensive
Campaign or a JFSC. The JFSC is a long-range precision strike by long-range
rocket, missile and air forces with the objective to destroy important enemy
targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems, weaken the will to
resist and destroy war potential, or create conditions for other operations. Conducting
precision strikes against key Indian targets was preferable to conducting
difficult offensive ground operations where the defender has an advantage. The
JFSC would support border counterattack or mountain offensive, but could also
represent an independent campaign.
Options
opposite Ladakh: Review of terrain analysis
(particularly Depsang Plains, Gogra Post area favors mechanized operations),
grouping of forces and their training in the WTC automatically suggest various
options available to include:
·
JFSC either in Eastern Ladakh or
Sikkim or Arunachal Pradesh separately or simultaneously by air, rocket forces
and artillery as a punishment.
·
Limited war either in Eastern
Ladakh or Sikkim or Arunachal Pradesh separately or simultaneously with the
JFSC operations.
·
Full scale conventional war
either in Eastern Ladakh or Sikkim or Arunachal Pradesh separately or
simultaneously with the JFSC operations.
·
Two Fronts War.
As per former Northern
Army Commander, Lt. Gen. HS Panag, most likely operational-level
objectives of the PLA in case of “limited war” may be as follows:
·
Capture SSN Sector and threaten Indian defenses
in Siachen Glacier.
·
Cut off the Darbuk-Shyok-DBO Road at Galwan
Valley — Shyok River junction to assist the offensive in SSN.
·
Capture Chang Chenmo River Valley and all areas
up to the north bank of Pangong Tso.
·
Secure/capture the Kailash Range in Chushul
Sector.
·
Capture the Indus Valley up to the Ladakh Range
via Demchok and Changla Pass on the Kailash Range and contact Indian defenses
on the Ladakh Range.
·
Pakistan is also likely to launch a
complementary offensive in the Shyok River Valley in the Turtuk Sector.
Options: With one
Mechanized Division, two Motorized Divisions, one Infantry Division, one
Special Operations Brigade and other supporting formations integral to Southern
Xinjiang Military Division, options at the operational level available include:
·
Launch offensive on four thrust lines with one
each Division or three thrust lines with one each Division keeping one Division
in reserve directed to achieve the objectives identified above.
·
Special Operations Brigade would be employed
in air mobile role to secure key terrain features behind defensive positions.
·
76 Army Group formations/units, RRUs from
other Army Groups and the PLA Air Force Air Borne Divisions may be employed as reserves/reinforcements as
per operational requirements.
Choices: Most likely
is resumption of PLA forays to occupy disputed areas as per their LAC claim
lines at their choice of timing and places to include:
·
Daulat Beg Oldi and Depsang Plains, Kongkar
La, Gogra Post, PP 15, Hot Springs and PP 17 to secure complete Northern ridge
line of Pangong Tso.
·
Considering long lines of communications
opposite Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim (Nyingchi-Mainling-Yadong- Lhasa), PLA
most likely conduct ‘feints and demonstrations” in the Eastern Theater.
·
Graduated escalation by execution of JFSC against key Indian targets across the Indo-Tibet
border in all sectors.
Thus, the ongoing “Talks” on de-escalation/disengagement is to be
viewed as a temporary reprieve only in the context of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese
Dream”. In today’s context, PLA has temporarily retracted. Xi Jinping’s
ultimate intent or end objective is to address lessons of history: “barbarians
encirclement”; “Century of humiliations”; and “accidents of history when
colonial powers imposed unfair border treaties when China was weak”. The
doctrine is “Extended Coercion and Creeping Incrementalism” or “Salami
Slicing”.
It is grossly unfair on the part of the nation and the
politic-bureaucratic decision makers to expect armed forces, particularly
ground forces to deter and counter PLA adventures effectively on the Indo-Tibet
borders, with their present force levels and weapons systems. Disengagement should not lull decision makers
into complacency. They must equip the armed forces with the latest high-tech
combat systems in adequate numbers to counter the PLA misadventures and give
enough time to train with them.
Viewed in the above framework of China’s “Grand Strategy”, Force
Levels and capabilities, Indian decision makers must exploit the peace
interregnum to identify inadequacies in force levels and combat weapons systems
post haste. Additional formations and combat weapon systems must be moved into
depth areas not only in the Ladakh Theater but also in both the Central and
Easter theaters. Modi and Rajanath Singh must also visit key locations in the
Central and Eastern Theaters.
(Review or Appreciation of PLA Capabilities in the Eastern Theater
follows)
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