review of PLAAF force




Accurate review of PLAAF force levels is most critical to determine capabilities on the Indo-Tibet border. Ipso facto, Aero-Space battles are determinant of final outcomes of battle, besides Cyber war capabilities in today’s Generation 5 Wars.

As per quite a few experts and analysts, Indian Air Force (IAF) has an edge against the PLAAF in battles to gain air dominance in the Indo-Tibet border region based on the current deployment of around 157 aircraft of all kinds and 50 drones primarily designated for strike missions, and eight other drones for surveillance. And, the type of fighters observed in the satellite pictures are inferior to the Indian fighters that would be employed against them.

More importantly, their four air bases – Hotan (opposite Ladakh), Lhasa, Ngari and Xigaze - proximity makes them vulnerable to an Indian air strike. Since all air bases are located on the Tibetan Plateau, their pay loads would be almost halved which is a serious constraint for them.

 
On a recheck from satellite pictures, 9 air bases/civilian air ports are available to include:  opposite Ladakh - Khasgar, Hotan, Ngari-Gunsa (200 km from Pangong Lake), and Ali in Burang tri junction of Nepal; Xigaze, Lhasa/Gonggar, Shannan (opposite Subansiri district), Nyingchi-Mainling (Siang district) and Bangda/Pangta (elevation 4334 m, runway length 5500 m, it is the world’s longest paved runway) which is about 170 km from the Indian border. Linzhi in Nyingchi prefecture is a civil airfield at an elevation of 2949 m,  is just 30 km from the Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh. Hotan and Ngari Kunsa airfields are closer with the distance to Leh being about 330 km to 350 km. Satellite imagery of 17 July 2020 clearly shows the deployment of J-7/8, J-11/16 or SU-30/35 fighters.
Most significantly, air power application is highly flexible depending on battlefield strategy requirements. It is, therefore, incorrect to draw conclusions based on numerical peace time locations. In-flight refueling would also enable PLAAF forces to maximize their strike capacity.
  
There are varying estimates of numbers of fighters/bombers/transport aircraft. As per Military Balance 2017, the PLAAF has been modernizing at a rapid pace with 600 fourth-generation fighter and plus-plus aircraft. Yet another report gives the PLAAF over 1000 modern fifth and fourth/fourth++ generation aircraft to include: includes J-35S, J-20, J-21, J-10S, J-11A, J-11B, J-11BS, Su-27SK, Su-27UBK, Su-30MKK, J-10, J-10A, and JH-7 aircraft. The existing fleet of Q-7, Su-35S, and Russian built Su-30MKK and indigenous J-10 and J-11B are tasked for regional air superiority and strike operations.  Even the old generation fighter/attack aircraft such as the J-7 (Mig-21) and J-8 have also been upgraded. In contrast, PLAAF data accessed from “Military Watch – Force Comparison” of 2019 provides a different picture as given below:

                                                India                      China
·         Air Superiority   283                         953 (95 xJ-20; 75xSu27; 530xJ-11;
                                                                        98xSu-30; 24xSu-35; 4++ J-11D to enter;
                                                                        96 x Interceptor J-8)
·         Multi Role           170                         830 (400xJ-10; 30xJ10C; 400xJ7)
·         Legacy                  244                         0
·         Strike                    0                              360 (240xXianJH-7;120xShen J-16)
·         Air to Ground    200                         840 (400x JL-8; 200xQ 5; 240 x JL-9)
·         Bomber                                0                              120 (120x Xian H-6)
------------------------------------------------------------
·         Total                      897                         3103

What are the realities of PLAAF qualitative superiority?  Let me start with Generation 5 fighter, that is, stealth fighter, J-20 that entered service in 2017. Its upgraded version J-20 B, equipped with “Thrust vector control (TVC)” that allows pilots to better control the aircraft by redirecting engine thrust, has entered into mass production. Its fourth production line has been commissioned in 2019, each one with a capacity to make about one J-20 a month – 95 presently in active service.

The development of stealth aircraft incorporated with advanced fifth generation capabilities, including super-cruise engines, advanced avionics and sensors that offer more timely situational awareness for operations in network-centric combat environments, radars with advanced targeting capabilities and protection against enemy electronic countermeasures, helmet mounted sights that allow them to target high-off-boresight PL-10E heat-seeking missiles within a 90-degree angle of the plane’s nose simply by looking at the target,  and integrated systems with advanced communication and GPS navigation functions make the aircraft capable of supporting a variety of tactical and regional missions.

Complementing J-20 Bs are 25 x Su 35 (purchased in 2016), 76 X J-16 Red Eagle, modification of Russia’s Sukhoi-30MKK comparable to US F-15-E, J-15s in a similar league as US FA-18E/F Hornets for aircraft career; J-11, J-11 B and D(clone of Su 27 in league of F-15E), J-10 A, B and C reputedly based on the Israeli IAI Lavi and by extension F-16,  JF – 17 Block III (upgraded MIG 21), J-8 II – 150 in service and Xian H20 – Strategic Bomber.  Add to them, J-31, technology from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, under develoment.

Add to them, China had inducted 15 tanker aircraft nationally as of 2017 for air refueling. China’s aviation industry is developing several types of AEW&C aircraft. This includes the KJ-200, based on the Y-8 transport, for AEW&C as well as intelligence collection and maritime surveillance, and the KJ-2000 - A-50 airframe.
Add to them, the WTC has assumed control of all regional strike aircraft and a varied drone armory. This includes an estimated 20 GJ-1/WD-1K precision strike UAVs, 12 WD-1 ground attack and reconnaissance UAVs, 12 WD-1 precision strike UAVs, and 8 EA-03 reconnaissance and electronic warfare UAVs.

Next, there are Operational Divisions - 3-5 fighter/strike/bomber/transport Divisions - in 5-Theater Commands as given below:
 
Ø  Central Theater Command: 7, 15, and  24 Fighter Divisions;  and 34 Transport Division.
Ø  Western Theater Command: 33, 44, 6 and 37 Fighter Divisions (nearly 36 squadrons); 36 Bomber Div (2squadrons); and 4 Transport Division.
Ø  Southern Theater Command: 2, 9, 18, 42 Fighter Divisions; 2 Indep Regt; 8 Bomber Div; and 13 Transport Division.
Ø  Eastern Theater Command: 3, 14, 29, 12, 19 Fighter Divisions; 28 and 5 Attack Divisions;3 and 1 Indep Regts; and 10 Bomber Division.
Ø  Northern Theater Command: 1, 4, 21 and 30 Fighter Divisions; 4 Indep Regt; and 11 Attack Division.
Ø  Airborne (AB) Corps:  43 AB Division; 44 AB Division; and 45 AB Division.
Ø  26 Fighter Division with one Regt Previously at Shanghai-Chongming Island.
Ø  31 Fighter Division previously with Jinan MR; 35 Fighter Div.

Each Fighter/Attack/Bomber/Transport Division in turn has 2-3 squadrons. And, the Airborne Corps operates directly under PLAAF command.

China’s ground-based air defense include the indigenous CSA-9 (HQ-9) and Russian SA- 10 (S-300PMU) and SA-20 (S-300PMU1/PMU2), which have the capability to protect against both aircraft and low-flying cruise missiles. China continues to pursue acquisition of the Russian extremely long-range SA-X-21b (S-400) SAM system (400 km), and is also expected to continue research and development to extend the range of the domestic CSA-9. It has received eight battalions of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU-2 long-range (200km) SAM systems since 2006 and another 8 battalions subsequently. The SA-20 system reportedly provides limited ballistic and cruise missile defense capabilities.

 In sum, by virtue of rapid response/redeployment capability borne out of flexible response strategy, China’s PLAAF cannot be viewed vulnerable to IAFs claims of gaining “air dominance” over the Indo-Tibet border region. Mere addition of few Rafael 4++ fighter per se cannot provide superior edge over the PLAAF since they can deploy J-20 stealth fighters as per operational requirements.

When viewed holistically from the IAF point of view, there is an inescapable need to acquire or mass produce additional fighters, particularly Tejas Mk 1A and Mk 2s, besides requesting vendors to arrange time bound supply of orders for MIG-29s and Su-30 MKIs by October/November 2020. Furthermore, there is also operation necessity to acquire Stealth fighters and UAVs.  Finally, the delivery schedule of S-400 radars with missiles from Russia must be fast tracked or immediately induct ingeniously developed radar systems.

Wake up – Oh Blind men of Hindustan! Stop jingoistic rhetoric. Prepare or Perish!  No point in indulging in Jingoist rhetoric. It is high time for political and bureaucratic decision makers to wake from their deep slumber and meet additional requirements earliest. And, HAL must be directed to match production rate to that of China – one Tejas per month on its 12 assembly lines.

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