Maldives - India’s Security Interests?

Mohamed Muizzu assumed office of the President in November 2023, who is regarded as a pro-China leader, India’s security interests have taken a “Nose-Dive”. Quite a few significant events have taken places recently that have far reaching ramifications on bi-lateral India’s relations. To start with, Muizzu demanded India to withdraw all Indian Army personnel (around 88 of them personnel stationed in the Maldives to help operate a Dornier aircraft and two helicopters provided by India) from the Islands by 15 March 2024. Of course, Muizzu suspended the three ministers after their social media derogatory postings against PM Modi following his visit to Lakshadweep Islands encouraging tourism promotion.

Far more important are Muizzu’s sharp remarks during and after the five-day China visit to include: elevation of relations to strategic partnership since establishing diplomatic relations in 1972; significance of China’s BRI (Belt Road Initiative); mutual respect for each other, and China’s full support for Maldives' sovereignty; China’s assurance to not interfere with the internal affairs of the Maldives; signing 20 “key” agreements including tourism promotion; firmly supporting China on the one-China principle issue governing Taiwan; and President Xi assurance to help the Maldives achieve its goals.

Most importantly, Muizzu sharp attack on India to include: Maldives is not in backyard of any particular country; We are an independent and sovereign state; We may be small, but that doesn't give you the license to bully us; no country has the right to exert influence over the domestic affairs of a country, regardless of its size; not allow any external influence on the domestic affairs of the Maldives; and plans to reduce the country’s dependency on India, including securing imports of essential food commodities and medicine and consumables from other countries. Male is also reviewing more than 100 bilateral agreements with New Delhi signed by the previous government here.

Let me highlight at the outset that Maldives political instability is endemic. Almost all the Presidents were overthrown by their successors. Maldives made transition from monarchy to a republic under Ibrahim Nasir in 1968. Nasir eventually had to flee to Singapore. Ibrahim Nasir ruled (1968-1978) followed by Gayoom 20-yeaar rule when there were 3 coup attempts - 1980, 1983 and 1988.; Mohamed Nasheed ruled 2018-2012, who was ousted in 2012. Subsequently, Maldives was governed by Mohammed Waheed Hassan (2012-2013), Abdulla Yameen (2013-2018), Ibrahim Mohammed Solilih (2018-2023) and Mohamed Muizzu (2023----). The 1988 coup attempt was foiled by the intervention of Indian Armed Forces at his request.

In the past, regime changes and instability governed the relations between India and Maldives. Whilst Gayoom and Solih sought closer relations with India, Abdulla Yameen, regarded as pro-China, pursued closer relations with China and led the ‘India Out’ campaign. And, the most recent rhetoric of Muizzu, regarded as pro-China, follows a similar pattern. Therefore, the main challenge to India’s diplomacy is balancing out all these contradictions into harmonious relations.

Let me also in outline briefly provide the historical facts: people lived in the Maldives during the Indus Valley civilization (3300–1300 BCE); linked to South Asia with early settlers, probably Gujaratis, who reached and settled; first settlers of the Maldives were before Emperor Asoka's kingdom in 269–232 BCE; people from Sri Lanka migrated to the Islands around 500-300 BCE records (Mahāvaṃsa 300 BCE); followed the 1400-years long Buddhism, probably spread in the 3rd century BCE at the time of Emperor Asoka’s expansion, consolidated by the ancient Maldivian Kings; and Islam introduced in 1153 when the last Buddhist King converted and adopted the title of “Sultan Muhammad al Adil” followed by 6 dynasties and 84 Sultans that lasted till 1968.

Be that as it may, the culture of the Maldives - Maldivian language, early Maldive scripts, architecture, ruling institutions, customs, and manners of the Maldivians - originated at the time when the Maldives were a Buddhist kingdom and survives today. After the Maldives became a “Sultanate”, all religions other than Sunni Islam were forbidden. Today, alcohol is banned in Male. However, due to economic compulsions, it is not banned in tourist resorts despite clamor by Islamic fundamentalists.

Yet another significant issue to note is the fact of the Maldives being a victim of Islamic fundamentalism with support particularly from Pakistan. In the past, the number of Maldivians drawn towards terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) and Pakistan-based Madrasas and jihadist groups has been increasing. Add to it, Maldives' greater strategic significance of seaborne terrorism that is emerging reality.

Of tremendous Maldives is its geo strategic significance. It is a chain of 1192 islands with 199 islands inhabited by 515,132 people as per the 2022 census. The islands straddles a 960-km-long submarine ridge running north to south and which forms a wall in the middle of the Indian Ocean – known as the “Toll Gate” on the key highway for global trade and energy flow. Nearly 50 per cent of India’s external trade and 80 per cent of her energy imports transit these westward SLOCs in the Arabian Sea. The islands are grouped under 26 atolls, each atoll being an administrative unit. In addition, Maldives is an important partner in India’s role as the net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region.

The straight line distance (airline route) from Kanyakumari, Tamil Nādu, and India to the geographic center of Maldives is 811 kms. Hardly one refers to Diego Garcia, the only inhabited island of the British Indian Ocean Territory, and a joint US/UK military base, that is located 1,796 km south-southwest of the southern tip of India (at Kanyakumari) and located 1,173 km South of Maldives. Also, the geostrategic significance of the Maldives needs to be considered in relation to the other Islands in the Indian Ocean region - Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles.

All major global powers are competing to influence small island states to ensure peace and stability in the IOR. For these island states, a strategy of hedging between major powers and enhancing cooperation with the United States, India, Japan, and Australia is an opportunity to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region.

Fact: China’s strategic interests and logistical limitations in the IOR have prompted it to exploit opportunities. Chinese primary objective in the IOR is to protect trade and oil transportation routes. Being dependent on Middle Eastern oil, China is interested in securing its ships carrying oil from the Gulf States. Therefore, China attempts to minimize its vulnerabilities through the BRI projects enhancing its political influence in the IOR. Towards such an end, China has developed overseas facilities based on Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar and Karachi in Pakistan, Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Marao Atoll, in Maldives, Djibouti at the entrance to the Red Sea and Somalia as outposts. Although China promotes infrastructure and trade development, these ports could potentially be of dual, civil and military use. However, they are viewed by India as encirclement – termed as the “String of Pearls”. Other regional powers also assume that the presence of the PLAN in the Indian Ocean will continue to grow and are therefore interested in controlling the Chinese influence in the region.

Therefore, it is but natural for China to actively establish its presence by involving itself in infrastructure projects in the archipelago. None should rule out the probability of China either establishing a naval base by acquiring one of the uninhabited islands towards Diego Garcia (Chagos Archipelago) or by long-term lease. After all, Chinese investments and loans constitute approximately 80% of the Maldives’ total debt. Currently, the Island state owes US$ 3.4 million in the form of debt to China. This represents 70% of Maldives’ total external aid. This alarming level implies that, by 2020 onwards, 15% of Malé’s budget will have to be spent on paying back this debt. Surely, to offset the loan, Maldives may enter into a long-term least of one of its islands. Surely, it is also a matter of strategic concern for the USA.

However, the growing dependence on China was not appreciated by the Maldivian electorate, and, amongst other factors, this resulted in Yameen’s political defeat in the 2019 parliamentary elections. Consequently, taking into account this financial burden of the country that relies heavily on tourism, China will likely remain an influential player in the Maldives.

India’s strategic end objective is a stable maritime environment in the Indian Ocean. In the past, India-Maldives relations had been close, cordial and multi-dimensional. In accordance with the “Neighborhood First” policy of the government, India remains a committed development partner for a stable, prosperous and peaceful Maldives. India rushed assistance when the 2004 Tsunami resulted in the drinking water crisis in Male. Also, during the COVID-19 outbreak and later, the Maldives has been the biggest beneficiary of the vaccines and provided crucial commodities to the Maldives under Mission SAGAR. Furthermore, India has also provided a new Coastal Radar System consisting of 10 India-built radar stations across the Maldives feeding into the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR). Also, provided $40 million in financing for major police infrastructure upgrades across the Maldives. India agreed to “develop, support, and maintain a Maldives National Defense Force Coast Guard Harbor” at Uthuru Thila Falhu Naval Base northwest of Malé and India extended a $50 million defense line of credit to the Maldives. Last, but not least, India signed a $500 million deal in 2021 for the Greater Male Connectivity Project, an infrastructure project involving the construction of a four-mile bridge and causeway connecting the Maldives’ capital Malé with three neighboring islands. The bridge would, notably, be four times longer than the China-constructed Sinamalé Bridge (also known as the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge), the first inter-island bridge in the Maldives.

The current media overdrive to slow the tourism flow to Maldives is totally unimaginative for India’s share is only 8% of total tourism inflows. China can easily offset reductions in India’s tourism flows, which was higher pre-Covid outbreak that practically became NIL post-Covid.

To sum up, Maldives, as one of the most strategically located islands in the Indian Ocean, holds immense importance to India but also to China and other global powers. So, increasing China’s influence in the Maldives is not only of serious concern from India’s security interests in the IOR, but also to other global powers with President Mohamed Muizzu pro-China stance. Today, China has scored over India in influencing Maldives. Even the United States and its allies also have concerns with the growing influence of China in the Indian Ocean. Can India and other global powers offer the Maldives a more attractive set of maritime options, ranging from tourism to security, than are currently on offer from Beijing? Otherwise, one cannot expect cordial relations with the Maldives. The potential for both countries to work together on adaptive and mitigating measures against the adverse maritime-impacts of climate change is enormous. This potential must be realized through imaginative foreign-policy and maritime-security initiatives. While the recent ‘India-First Policy’ of the Maldives and India’s ‘Neighborhood First Policy’ is intuitively complementary, the challenge lies in implementing these policies with cultural, geo economic and geostrategic sensitivity. What is needed in such a volatile environment is tremendous diplomatic sagacity and dexterity by various ways and means.