As
reported by CNN, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on
22 September 2020, Xi Jinping (Head of the CCP, Commander-in-Chief of the PLA and the President –
hailed as “core”, or ‘Hexin’ representing tokens of power used to describe
strong leaders invented by Deng, a way to advertise dominance), urged the world to "join hands to uphold
the values of peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom shared
by all of us." Xi stated that “Beijing
wants to continue to work as a builder of global peace, a contributor to global
development and a defender of international order." As per China’s media mouth pieces, “China has no intention to fight either a
Cold War or a hot war with any country.”
Furthermore, Xi Jinping also stated
that “China is committed to peaceful, open, cooperative and common development,
Xi said at the general debate of the 75th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly. We will never
seek hegemony, expansion, or sphere of influence.” Most importantly, Xi Jinping
also stated that “China will continue to narrow differences and resolve
disputes with others through dialogue and negotiation.”
Great sermons as upholder of
“Peace”! But, his rhetoric does not match with PLA actions on ground in various
theaters on its periphery and betrays his “Janus” face. If Xi Jinping is genuine in his pursuit of
peace, he must abandon the doctrine of “Creeping Incrementalism and extended
Coercion” as part of his “Chinese Dream”.
In particular, on the Indo-Tibet
border, Xi Jinping must order his PLA to comply expeditiously with 3-Ds –
de-escalation, disengagement and de-induction of formations/units to peace
stations.
The joint statement in circulation
in the public domain after 7th round Corps Commander level talks on
20 September 2020 concerns de-escalation – the first step.
But, disengagement – 2nd
step - means restoration of May 2020 status quo ante on the LAC that is,
pulling back troops to positions and restoration of patrolling activity.
So, it is disengagement that is critical.
Disengagement implies formations/units of Xinjiang Military District forces,
particularly mechanized and motorized divisions must revert to their peace
locations; 76th Group with headquarters located in Xining City, Qinghai
Province; 77th Group Army with headquarters located in Changzhou City, Chengdu
City, Sichuan Province; and Tibet Military District forces.
Finally, what about 3rd
D delineation and physical demarcation of LAC and its ratification as International
Boundary?
In reality, Xi Jinping, on the
external front, has been indulging in brinkmanship also with Taiwan. Recently,
the PLA Air Force amidst heightening tensions in the South China Sea has
repeatedly breached Taiwan’s airspace crossing the Middle Line. According to
CNA, Beijing has sent two Xian H-6 bombers, 12 Shenyang J-16s, two Shenyang
J-11s, two Chengdu J-10s, and one Shaanxi Y-8 anti-submarine aircraft near the
southwest and northwest of the island nation.
What is most important is to note
the exhortation of Xi Jinping, in his address during the second day of
country's plenary parliamentary session on 26 May 2020. Xi Jinping directed the
PLA to scale up for war-like preparations and make themselves ready for
"worst-case scenario" amid the COVID-19 pandemic.
Also, at the two-day [28th and 29th
August] 7th Tibet Work Forum attended by the senior Communist Party leaders in
Beijing, Xi Jinping delivered a fiery speech calling China to build an
“impregnable fortress” to maintain stability in Tibet, protect national unity
and educate the masses in the struggle against “separatists”. It was hailed in the official Chinese media as
“setting policy direction for Tibet”. Xinhua News, one of the Chinese Community
Party’s (CCP) official mouthpieces, quoted Xi as saying, “Efforts must be made
to build a new modern socialist Tibet that is united, prosperous, culturally
advanced, harmonious and beautiful. Work related to Tibet must focus on
safeguarding national unity and strengthening ethnic solidarity. More education
and guidance should be provided for the public to mobilize their participation
in combating separatist activities, thus forging an ironclad shield to
safeguard stability.”
And Xi Jumping’s “sinicization” of
Tibet, but also Xinjiang to crush any dissent is well known in the
international political arena.
Modi too had stated in his address
to troops after the Galwan incident in June 2020 at Leh that “The sovereignty
and integrity of India is supreme, and nobody can stop us in defending that. He
vowed that the sacrifice of our soldiers will not be in vain. Modi also
iterated that “India wants peace, but if provoked India is capable of giving a
befitting reply.”
Ipso facto, both leaders are facing
major challenges at home to overcome.
They can ill afford to risk losing face over disputed area on the LAC.
After the Galwan incident, both leaders have deployed reinforcements that are
facing each other in eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation that can dangerously
escalate anytime out of control by one action of a soldier suffering from
hallucinations in Terrestrial Areas.
Both Xi Jinping and Modi have
expressed their yearning for peace; but the assertive, aggressive and
expansionist actions of Xi Jinping on the ground not only against Taiwan and
India, but also in South China Sea, East China Sea against Japan and South
Korea betray his postures behind the “Peace Mask” for nations attending the UN General
Assembly sessions.
Let me also record the extracts of
latest article in Global Times that provides insight into Chinese coercion and
arms twisting. As per Global Times article “India's stubborn stance is an
obstacle to China-India frontline disengagement. It is hard to expect a
comprehensive agreement to be reached in just one or two meetings since the
joint press release made no mention of “"complete disengagement" of
their troops. There is good reason to believe that even with a temporary plan
of disengagement, India will again make provocations when it perceives
international environment is in its favor.” Unambiguously, the author
highlights lack of mutual trust at the strategic level.
Furthermore, the author blames
India for its negotiating tactic of insisting PLA to withdraw from all friction
points with a timeline, and give "free and unhindered access to Indian
forces to all patrol points" in order to strike a deal thereby
forcing Beijing to accept the LAC
determined by India. If India continues to stick to such stubborn stances, no
frontline disengagement will ever occur, and all forthcoming negotiations and
talks will be meaningless. Finally, the
author warns that “it is understandable for them to show a tough image to its
own people, but such a display of Indian military muscle will have no effect on
Beijing.”
Let me “nail the lies” in the
Global Times by reviewing in brief outline the issue of Patrolling Points (PPs)
and agreements in the past over the LAC to. PPs were identified by the China
Study Group in 1975 on the basis of LAC claim line, which are prominent
landmarks which are marked on the LAC.
They serve as a guide to the location of the LAC for the soldiers,
acting as indicators of ‘actual control’ exercised on the territory by India.
Over a period, posts have been established near the PPs.
There are five major agreements
signed between India and China to ensure peace on the LAC to include:
·
1993
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity.
·
1996
Confidence Building Measures Agreement limiting deployment of major categories
of armaments including tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns with 75mm or
bigger caliber, mortars with 120-mm or above, various missiles and limiting
combat aircraft from flying within 10 kms; and denouncing use of force or
engaging in hostile activities among others.
·
2005
Agreement specifying ‘standard operating procedures’ laid down to obviate
patrol clashes.
·
2012
Agreement setting out a process for consultation and cooperation.
·
2013
‘Border Defence Cooperation Agreement’ following the Depsang intrusion by the PLA. Its
emphasis was on enhancing border cooperation and exercising maximum restraint
in case of ‘face-to-face’ situations. Wherever there was a difference of
perceptions in disputed areas termed as ‘grey zones’, both sides could patrol
up to the perceived line, but were not to undertake any build-up.
Ipso facto, the term
"LAC" gained legal recognition in Sino-Indian agreements signed in
1993 and 1996. The 1996 agreement states, "No activities of either side
shall overstep the LAC."
Following 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi
incident, it was resolved to withdrew troops in exchange for a Chinese
agreement to destroy some military structures over 250 km to the south near
Chumar that the Indians perceived as threatening. The agreement was signed in
Beijing's Great Hall of the People following a meeting between Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.
Most importantly, the 2013
Agreement specified that neither side shall use or threaten to use force
against the other by any means. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary
question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect and
observe the LAC between the two sides.
No activities of either side shall overstep the LAC. In case personnel of one
side cross the LAC, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall
immediately pull back to their own side of the LAC. Each side will keep its
military forces in the areas along the LAC to a minimum level…... The two sides
agreed to reduce their military forces along the LAC in conformity with the
requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings to be
mutually agreed.
Viewed in the above framework of
5-Agreements in the past, who is responsible for the ongoing Indo-Tibet border
stand-off, particularly in Eastern Ladakh – Depsang, Hot Springs, Finger 4 on
the Northern Bank of Pangong Tso and the South Bank of Pangong Tso. Chinese PLA is squarely to be blamed for
violating the provisions of past agreements pertaining to deployment of forces
with Mechanized and Motorized Forces and other combat support brigades from the
Xinjiang Military District deployed in force on the LAC.
Mercilessly exposed is the author’s
jingoistic rhetoric in the Global Times. He fails to realize that patrolling
points have been agreed upon and Indian troops enjoyed "free and
unhindered access" to them in the past after 1962. By blocking access to
Indian patrols to mutually agreed patrolling points, it is the PLA which is
stalling meaning talks and resolution on disengagement.
Be that as it many, neither Xi
Jinping nor Modi, both nationalist leaders consolidating their position in
their domestic arena, have little room to concede lest it is viewed as a
“surrender” and “Weakness”.
If Xi Jinping genuinely believes in
the statement he made to the UN General Assembly, what prevents him as the
Chairman of the CMC and Commander-in-Chief of PLA, to order his forces to
revert to status quo of May 2020 pending speedy final resolution of
delineation/demarcation of LAC in a time bound manner instead of continuing
endlessly in adjournment of talks at all levels – political, diplomatic and
military level talks to de-escalate and disengage troops.
When compared to the political
compulsions of Modi heading India, a vicious or messy democracy, Xi Jinping wearing
four hats-in-one is in a better position to make his followers to convince on
his decisions over the quid pro quo settlement of the LAC and ratifying it as
the international boundary. Why can’t Xi Jinping renew the “Quid Pro Quo” offer
first made by Zhou-en Lai in 1960s and Deng’s offer to Rajiv Gandhi?
In sum, Xi Jinping appears to have
adopted “strategic stalemate” that can also be viewed as “strategic retreat” in
Mao Zedong’s theory of warfare considering mounting anti-China postures on the
international arena. Also, it could be due to military outstretching to manage
multiple fronts. Finally, the costs, both human and economic costs, of
maintaining additional forces in face-to-face confrontation in Terrestrial
areas appear to be a dampener.
Viewed in the above framework,
India under Modi led NDA rule has to sagaciously manage the Indo-Tibet border
crisis situation based on PLAs disengagement followed by de-induction. And, the
current stand-off must be used to modernize not only the Indian armed forces by
merger and integration besides equipping them with advanced combat systems, but
also carryout merger and integration of ITBF, SSB and Assam Rifles under the
Ministry of Defense.
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