Post-independence Radicalization

Post-independence developments can be broadly grouped under four broad heads: Conciliation (1947-1956), Confrontation (1957-1966), Coalition (1967-1977) and Collision (1977-1985). The evolution of the state of Punjab makes an interesting study. East Punjab (35% Sikhs) in August 1947; PEPSU (49.3% Sikhs) in 1948; and Punjab (56% Sikhs) in 1966 represent the evolution of the state of Punjab. Yet, the Sikh majority did not favor the Akalis to enjoy unchallenged political power.

During the Conciliation period, the Akali Dal was confined to religious activity. In 1948, its prominent leaders joined the Congress Party to reap post-partition rehabilitation benefits. Even Master Tara Singh withdrew from politics. It was only in 1956 that the Akali Dal re-entered active politics and sought an unequal alliance with the Congress Party, notwithstanding the rejection of the Sikh demand for a separate state based on Panjabi language by the States Reorganization Committee and Nehru’s anti-Panjabi politics. In fact, the Akali Dal could not produce a single leader to counter Kairon’s dynamic leadership. The Sikhs too were content with the politico-socio- economic developments of the period.

Confrontation period was between 1957 and 1966: In the 1960s, the Green and the White revolutions promoted prosperity and spurt in education. The Sikhs migrated in very large numbers to foreign nations (2, 00,000 in two decades). Furthermore, socially there was degeneration of Sikh youth: liquor, drugs, cigarettes and shaving of beards, which threatened their distinctive identity and martial character. On the other side, economically rich urban Hindu concentrations gained control over the economy and acquired disproportionate wealth.

However, it was the Hindu fanatics, who provided an opportunity to Master Tara Singh, by launching the ‘Panjabi Suba’ agitation in 1957. In January 1960, Master Tara Singh secured control of the SGPC by contesting on the ‘Panjabi Suba’ platform. When he was arrested in April 1960, Sant Fateh Singh assumed the Akali leadership and went on a fast unto death (22 days). On release, even Master Tara Singh attempted a fake fast unto death (40 days), which got into disrepute and resulted in his removal from both the SGPC and the Akali Dal. He formed his own Akali Dal, which passed resolutions both in 1965 and 1966 seeking a self determined status within the Republic of India. However, it was not the confrontation tactics of the Akali religious leaders, but the patriotism of the Sikh masses both in the 1962 and the 1965 wars, which secured the present Punjab for them in 1966. The indecision on transfer of Chandigarh, once again, gave the Akalis cause for continuing their confrontation tactics, although Sant Fateh Singh accepted the award. Both the Akali Dal factions immediately announced their intentions to contest the elections and form their own government.

Coalition period was between 1967 and 1977: On the political front, the Akali Dal groups forged an alliance with the Communists in 1967 to somehow win elections. In March 1967, although the Congress Party emerged as the single largest party (48 out of 104 seats), the Akali groups combined with divergent opposition parties and formed a coalition government. In November 1967, Tara Singh’s hardliners defected under Congress guidance and formed a minority government with the Congress Party support from outside. It was followed by the imposition of President’s Rule in August 1968, when the Congress Party withdrew its support. However, the Akalis won the 1969 elections and formed a coalition government with the Jan Sangh.

In 1969, the first signs of Sikh extremist fundamentalism manifested when Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, former finance minister of Punjab, proclaimed the Sovereign Republic of Khalistan in London, which was treated as a big Sikh joke. It was also during this time that Darshan Singh Pheruman expired after 74 days fast for the transfer of Chandigarh.

Meanwhile, Gurnam Singh extended his party’s support to Indira Gandhi during the Congress crisis in 1969. Sant Fateh Singh attempted a second fast unto death on 26 January 1970. On the 8th day of Sant’s fast, Indira Gandhi announced the award of Chandigarh to Punjab. It led to a confrontation between the religious and political leadership over who should get the credit, which resulted in Gurnam Singh’s expulsion and appointment of Prakash Singh Badal as the Chief Minister.

Meanwhile, there was a large Hindu influx, particularly farm labor, which disturbed the population structure of Punjab (61% Sikhs in 1971 reduced to 52% in 1981). Despite P.S. Badal’s pro-peasant policies, the Akalis were wiped out during the 1971 and 1972 elections. Out of power, the Akalis hardened their postures and adopted the controversial Anandapur Sahib resolution in October 1973.

In August 1973, the Anandapur Sahib Resolution was drafted by a group of eminent Sikh intellectuals, which postulated the theory of Sikh homeland and the pre-eminence of the Khalsa. Its fallout was simple. Whenever the Akali Dal could not form a government, it extrapolated the Sikh homeland issue and invoked the Hindu Bogey. Basically, there were two religious demands, that is, legislation of All India Gurudwaras Act and free access to all Sikh shrines including Nankana Sahib in Pakistan. The political issues are restructuring of the Constitution on real federal principles and restoration of Panjabi-speaking areas to Punjab. Predictably, the Sikh recruitment and arms issues were also raised.

The emergency of 1975, however, delayed escalation of the Akali confrontation, which was followed by the resounding victory of the Akali Dal-Janata Party coalition. In power, the Akalis remained subdued on Anandapur Sahib Resolution.

Collision period extended during 1978-85: The rise and fall of the Bhindranwale phenomenon occurred during this period. It was followed by power struggles within the Akali Dal. Those enjoying power stressed for moderation, although they endorsed the Anandapur Sahib resolution. Even a section of the moderates attempted to transform the Akali Dal into a genuine regional party with a view to reduce the importance of religious leadership. On 13 April 1978, the hardliners organized the first pressure group called the Dal Khalsa with the avowed aim demanding the creation of an independent sovereign Sikh state. The Dal Khalsa challenged the Akali Dal in the SGPC elections with the backing of Bhindranwale. Yet, it lost the elections. It advocated the use of violence to achieve its objectives. The extremist strategy was therefore, aimed at driving out the Hindus, thereby forcing the Sikh influx to ensure a large majority and aimed at removing the political anomaly.

Alongside, the Babbar Khalsa, a political offshoot of Akhand Kirtani Jatha, was established in 1978 in India. This group looked upon the Jewish struggle for the creation of Israel as a model for organizing its activities. It considered Pakistan as its natural and cultural neighbor and stressed that members of the Sikh community abroad would have an important role to play in the liberation of Khalistan.

The Dal Khalsa established a branch in the UK on 4 January 1983 in West Germany in June 1983; in Canada in 1981. In May 1983, the group held a joint meeting with the Babbar Khalsa, Vancouver, in London and raised the banner of revolt. In sum, the crisis became international. The Dal Khalsa was responsible for hijacking an Indian airline aircraft to Lahore on 29 September 1981 and the acts of sacrileges in Amritsar on 26 April 1982. However, both groups claim responsibility for the killing of Lala Jagat Narain and D.I.G. Atwal. The police crackdown on the Dal Khalsa in the aftermath of the Indian Airlines hijacking incident resulted in its members seeking refuge in the Golden Temple.

The Main Demands included: Sikh Homeland and Real Federalism; Restoration of Punjabi-speaking areas; All India Gurudwaras Act; Recruitment and arms issues; and River waters distribution and control over headwork’s.

Bhindranwale Phenomenon

Religious fundamentalism and terrorism were twin tenets of the Bhindranwale phenomenon. He adopted the process of intimidation and terrorization to achieve well-defined politico-religious objectives of driving them out of Punjab and ensuring the return of the Sikhs living outside Punjab. It presents an interesting similarity with the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine.

Furthermore, he exploited contemporary political developments to promote politico religious interests of the Sikhs, whereas, political parties attempted to exploit his emergence to further vested interests instead of overall national interests. In the ultimate analysis, his legacy succeeded in creating a near permanent wedge in Hindu-Sikh relations and demonstrated the potency of extremist terrorism as an internal security threat. In the end, he gained religious martyrdom.

Bhindranwale's rise, of course, is controversial. In August 1977, he became the head of Damdama Taksal, the prime Sikh monastery. At the outset, he expressed his commitment to Khalistan and violent means. Yet, Zail Singh, former president of India, and the Congress (I) sponsored the emergence of both Bhindranwale and Dal Khalsa with a view to countervail the Akali Dal’s clout. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob have produced adequate circumstantial evidence to prove that “the man who had been the Chief Minister of Punjab and was to go on to become the Home Minister in the Central Cabinet and then President of India, continued to promote its cause.”

It is an established fact that Zail Singh as home minister allowed Bhindranwale to actively support the Congress (I) candidates in selected constituencies during the 1980 elections. He ordered the release of Bhindranwale after he was arrested on Darbara Singh’s orders in October 1981. More importantly, he allowed Bhindranwale triumphant visit to Delhi with his supporters brandishing weapons and spreading Sikh-Hindu hatred in April 1982.

Meanwhile, the Bhindranwale cult of extremist violence took a significant toll on its opponents, irrespective of religion. He attempted to engineer a clash with the Nirankaris on 13 April 1978 on Baisakhi day, which resulted in the death of 13 Sikhs due to police firing. In retaliation, Baba Gurucharan Singh, head of the Nirankari Mission in Delhi was killed on 24 April 1980. In September 1980, the Indian Airlines plane was hijacked to Lahore. Lala Jagat Narain, editor of Hind Samachar and an Arya Samaj activist was killed on 9 September 1981.

If the Congress (I) attempted appeasement between 1978 and 1982, whilst out of power in Punjab, to serve its vested interests, even the Akali Dal joined the bandwagon of riding the tiger to protect and consolidate its hold on Sikh affairs and thwart Congress (I) designs. As a result, political rivalry for pre-eminence unwittingly promoted dangerous extremist- cum-terrorist religious fundamentalism, which ultimately paved the way for a dismal politico-religious outcome.

Meanwhile, desecration of Hindu religious places was launched to provoke Hindu backlash elsewhere. As the Bhindranwale campaign of violence escalated, even the Akali Dal decided to match it with its own brand of militancy— declared a holy war against the government and masterminded the Jail Barao agitation. Later, they stormed the parliament and followed it up with a succession of agitations: Nahar Roko (canals blockade), Rail Roko (railway blockade), and Rasta Roko (road blockade) and Kam Roko (work stoppage). Even a ‘Morcha’ was launched to demand the release of Amrik Singh, Bhindranwale’s right-hand man, and the President of the AISSF in July 1982.

By mid-1982, Bhindranwale chose to conduct his fight for Khalistan from the Golden Temple. In all this high drama, the Akalis became silent bystanders. They were a divided house: P.S. Badal advocated moderation; Tohra advocated support to the extremists; and, Longowal steered the mid-course. All of them dithered, but agreed that the party would be isolated, if they failed to do something. So, they too joined the talk of Holy War to realize the demands listed in Anandpur Sahib Resolution.

In 1983, President’s Rule was imposed. Meanwhile, Bhindranwale wrested the initiative and control inside the Golden Temple after a bitter struggle with Longowal and the high priests, and entrenched himself for the final showdown. The last minute negotiations between Tohra and Bhindranwale failed with the emergence of Hindu Suraksha Samiti. At this stage, Longowal issued the call for a bandh to prevent the transfer of food grains. It forced the government to issue orders to the army to conduct operations inside the Golden Temple.

The army conducted Operation Blue star between 4 and 7 June 1984. Longowal, Tohra and Harminder Singh Sandhu of AISSF along with 400 others surrendered. Bhindranwale was killed. The Sikhs all over the world mourned. The Hindu reaction was one of relief. Yet, violence did not recede. On 9 June 1984, Jagjit Singh Chauhan called upon patriotic Sikhs to rise up and assassinate Indira Gandhi, her son Rajiv and the senior military officers who conducted the operation. He organized Sikh terrorist groups under the aegis of the World Sikh Organization founded in New York in July 1984, as a response to the desecration of the Golden Temple, based on Sikhs residing in five foreign nations: USA, Canada, Great Britain, Norway and Holland. Others to attend the convention were: Kashmir Liberation Front, Tamil separatist organizations and Afghan Mujahideen.

The Sikh extremists struck on 31 October 1984. Indira Gandhi’s Sikh bodyguards murdered her and the Hindus mourned. Some of the Sikhs rejoiced. The high priests, who condemned the act first, withdrew it 24 hours later, accentuating the estranged feelings. Then broke out Hindu- Sikh communal riots in Delhi and in other places led by Congress (I) activists. Apprehending police brutalities, a large number of youth crossed over to Pakistan, - where they were indoctrinated, trained and issued weapons by Pakistan’s ISI.

All-important Akali leaders, except P.S. Badal, were arrested. It created a void in the Akali leadership and led to its splinterization and marginalization. Development and consolidation of religious extremism-cum-terrorism forced both political and religious leadership to adopt a low or pro-militant profile. Thus, when the central government attempted its political initiatives by releasing Akali leaders, it did not dramatically alter the situation. Attempted reunification of Longowal and Talwandi groups failed to materialize. Instead, a truncated United Akali Dal (UAD) under Baba Joginder Singh (father of Bhindranwale) emerged. Meanwhile, the terrorist strategy was simple. It aimed at teaching a lesson to anyone attempting to negotiate an accord with the central government. In January 1985, terrorists attacked Giani Kirpal Singh, head priest of Akal Takht, in broad daylight and inflicted serious injuries. However, he survived.

Political Flux or Faux Pas

Ultimately, the Rajiv-Longowal Accord was signed in July 1985. It became a non-starter due to the factional politics of the Akali Dal. Even Badal and Tohra denounced and refused to endorse the Accord in the party meeting. Such was the awesome might of the militant’s gun. It was followed by Longowal’s assassination on 20 August 1985, which naturally imposed caution even amongst the moderates. Nonetheless, Longowal’s Akali Dal won the elections in September 1985. Bamala became the party leader and the Chief Minister instead of Badal. The TADA Prevention Act 1985 was promulgated.

Meanwhile, both the SGPC and the Akal Takhat were, once again, taken over by the radicals of the Damdam Taksal and the AISSF. In November 1985, Giani Sahib Singh, the head granthi of the Golden Temple, was shot within the Golden Temple complex on the morning of Guru Nanak’s birthday. But, he survived. Next, the militants dismissed the moderate religious leadership for their alleged collaboration with the government and passed excommunication orders against Zail Singh, the president of India, and Buta Singh, the home minister, at a truncated Sarbat Khalsa Convention on 26 January 1986. The combined militant groups selected a Panthic Committee as an apex body. However, moderates held yet another Sarbat Khalsa at Anandapur and revoked the orders issued by the radicals. At such a crucial stage, Badal walked out of the Akali Dal (Longowal) to form a separate group.

In April 1986, Operation Black Thunder, a police action, was launched inside the Golden Temple, when the Panthic Committee (Militant-sponsored religious leadership) announced the declaration of a separate state of Khalistan and proclaimed its intention to seek a UN seat. Meanwhile on 10 August 1986, General A.S. Vaidya, former chief of army staff, was shot dead in broad daylight in Pune. On 3 October 1986, there was an attempt made to kill Ribeiro, the DGP, at the Punjab Armed Police Campus, in Jullundur. Meanwhile, Barnala’s image suffered a blow when his candidate was defeated in the SGPC elections in November 1986. Tohra was re-elected as its president with Badal’s support. In December 1986, both Tohra and Badal were arrested to neutralize their increasing power potential, which only assisted the growth of militancy.

Next, the high drama of removal of high priests of religious institutions was enacted. Prof. Darshan Singh Ragi was appointed as the head priest of Akal Takhat. The newly appointed head priests issued the Hukumnama ordering Akali leaders to submit their resignations to facilitate the formation of UAD. In response, both Badal and Joginder Singh submitted their resignations, whereas Barnala refused. So, the head priests declared him Tankhaiya and excommunicated him. In May 1987, the President’s rule was re-imposed. In March 1988, the Legislative Assembly was dissolved.

At this stage, even the UAD withdrew in favor of militants to run Sikh affairs. In September 1987, the high priests too gave a call to the Sikhs to reject the Akali Dal in favor of militants, which the SGPC challenged. It led to the arrest of high priests, who were later released in March 1988 as part of yet another political initiative. In May 1988, Jasbir Singh Rode was appointed as the jathedar of Akal Takhat.

In February 1988, the government attempted a political initiative to have a dialogue with jathedars and Sikh politicians lodged in Jodhpur jail, as detenus for over four years, who claimed that they could influence the militants. Five jathedars and 40 detenus were released. The security forces’ pressure was relieved as a concession which the militants took advantage of and started rallying all over again in the Golden Temple. Thus, the second police action, Operation Black Thunder II, was launched inside the Golden Temple in May 1988. It was a remarkable success and an effective blow to fundamentalist militancy-cum terrorism. It was followed by the appointment of Sant Thakur Singh as the chief of Damdama Taksal and Darshan Singh as the jathedar of Akal Takhat. It heralded the end of the Bhindranwale era.

By then, several terrorist outfits had sprung up, such as, Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Commando Force, Khalistan Liberation Front, Bhindranwale Tiger Force, Khalistan Liberation Organization, Shelly Regiment and so on. When their top leadership was killed/captured, the groups fell into the hands of criminals. Many poor youth with rural socio-economic background and lack of ideological commitment joined their ranks. Many joined under fear of reprisals both from the police and the terrorists Criminals/smugglers enjoying Pakistani support carried out extortions/murders/rapes. Sikhs living in foreign nations blindly lent support to militants.

Causes

In the ultimate analysis, the main cause for the Punjab internal crisis is primarily psychological. Basically, it is due to disgruntled leadership irrespective of party affiliations. The Sikh identity crisis has been exploited to create anarchy. National, regional and religious interests have been relegated to secondary status. Major factors, which have been used to abet internal strife include: a) Sikh identity crisis due to the ongoing modernization process; b) Self-centric politico-religious leadership; c) Volatile politico-religious interface; d) Population migrations upsetting politico-socio-economic structural balances and equilibrium; e) Bogey of Hindu revivalism, assimilation and absorption; f) Contrived injustices, such as, demand for job reservations; g) Lack of political will and national consensus; and h) Pakistani factor. More importantly, the election arithmetic of Sikh percentage is crucial to understand. As per the 1981 census, it dropped to 52 per cent. It is a significant shift. Naturally, the Sikhs are not comfortable. There is a deep divide between the higher, middle and lower classes of Sikhs, and the rural and urban divide. So, the Hindu minority and other communities play a vital role during the elections.

Next, the mood of Sikhs residing outside Punjab is certainly not in favor of militancy. Also, there is a distinct change in the mood and attitudes of foreign-based Sikhs. Fortunately, people have not polarized on communal lines so far. There are still many examples of Sikh-Hindu unity in countering terrorist violence. However, they are watching the developments closely and keeping their options open.

Political Initiatives

After independence, the government attempted a number of half-baked political initiatives which included: redrawing of boundaries of the state; announcement of Chandigarh Award in 1969; Indira Gandhi’s negotiation attempts between 1982 and 1984; Rajiv-Longowal Accord of 1985; announcement of various commissions on Chandigarh and sharing of waters; appointment of judicial investigations into anti-Sikh riots; and release of head priests. However, both Haryana and Punjab governments displayed uncompromising attitudes out of fear of losing their vote banks. Even the role of opposition political parties is dubious. Every political party expresses inclination, but does not participate in the normalization process to safeguard their electoral prospects. Thus, the dreading stalemate.

To sum up, the Punjab problem is unique in many ways. The fruits of economic developments have not convinced the Sikhs that their interests will be better served and they can live with dignity, honor and respect. People are extremely sensitive and highly volatile. It is not easy to accurately assess people’s aspirations, particularly their subconscious enlightened self-interest. Of course, the religious leadership has regained control, but still unable to reassert its authority. Amongst Akalis, there is unlikely to be unity and consensus for too long.

Article by GB Reddy Sir