Oh, “Blind men of
Hindustan” wake up at least now after the ongoing fracas with the Chinese PLA
and carryout a de novo review Border Security Management System (BSMS) to
redress the shortcomings, weaknesses or anomalies and redress them with utmost
expediency.
Do appreciate and admit that persisting with the
existing “multiple security agencies - the Indo Tibetan Birder Police (ITBP),
the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB, the Assam rifles (AR) and the Border Security
Force (BSF)” - working in water tight compartments cannot ensure effective security
at optimum costs to the treasury to cover Line of Actual Control (LAC), Line of
Control (LoC) and the international borders.
Ipso facto, they are woefully incapable of deterring Chinese
PLA “Creeping incrementalism and Extended Coercion” strategy to bite away large
tracts of disputed areas of the Indo-Tibetan border.
Politico-bureaucratic
combine must stop nurturing apprehensions of military coup by the Indian Armed
Forces. For they realize that management of India’s pluralist societal divide
is best left to political and bureaucratic leadership.
No need to order yet another Experts Committee to
suggest a refined BSMS. Since the
primary task of all agencies is to maintain “Vigil or Guard (eyes and ears)”
over assigned areas of operational responsibility in peace and operate under
the Indian Army, it is high time that they are merged with the Indian Army and
under the Ministry of Defense.
Bashing the current
government machinery for intelligence failure is yet another ploy not only by
political rivals but also by quite a few masquerading as security strategy and
military affairs experts. Gone are the days of excessive dependence on
HUMANINT. Today, military satellites are hovering overhead providing “Hawk Eye”
24x365 coverage of all activities particularly over barren snow covered high
altitude mountains along the Indo-Tibet border. So, those calling it as
intelligence failure at the strategic, operational and tactical levels are
woefully ignorant of the capabilities of intelligence system of today.
Furthermore, there are many private organizations available to provide
intelligence inputs at very low costs even for individuals.
Intelligence about the deployment of PLA Combined
Arms Brigades (CABs) of Tibet Military District and the CABs of 76 and 77 Army
Groups of Western Theater Command was available even for independent observers
like me well before May 2020. Thus, apportioning the blame on intelligence failure
reflects ignorance on critic’s part that appears to be the visual media
obsession nowadays.
In reality, the blame squarely lies on the “Blind men
of Hindustan” – political and bureaucratic decision makers - for conceptually creating
BSMS dating back to the aftermath of the 1962 war.
Let me review broadly the basics of the BSMS for “Aam
Admi” understanding focused on the Indo-Tibet border. By original conception, the
Indo Tibetan Birder Police (ITBP), the Border Security Force (BSF) and the
Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) were created for employment on the Indo-Tibet border
stretching from Ladakh to the eastern boundary of Arunachal Pradesh. Subsequently over the past 60 years, the BSMS
has undergone many changes due to multiplication of secondary roles at cross
purposes with primary roles.
Let me highlight that they were raised consequent to unilateral
PLA conditional withdrawal from captured territories mandating that neither
country deploy regular army troops within 20 kms of the disputed areas. In
particular, the ITBP was to man border posts at altitudes as high as 21,000
feet in the western, middle & eastern sector of the border. Today, the ITBP
claims to be a mountain trained force and most of the officers & men are
trained mountaineers and skiers. But,
where are they either in Daulat Beg Oldie or Depsang or Galwan Valley or
Pangong Tso?
The ITBP present roles include: 1) Vigil on the
northern borders, detection and prevention of border violations, and promotion
of the sense of security among the local populace; 2) Check illegal immigration
and trans-border smuggling; 3) Provide security to sensitive installations and
threatened VIPs; 4) Restore and preserve order in any area in the event of a
disturbance; and 5) To maintain peace.
Most laughable it
is to assign the role for specialized force to operate in high altitudes to
“Provide security to sensitive installations and threatened VIPs” besides other
law and order roles. What more with
passage of time, the roles of ITBP diversified into many other areas to cover:
disaster management; Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJW) and
training; Dogs Basic Training centre; Commando units to
provide security to the Embassy and consulates of India in Afghanistan; United
Nation Mission in Congo; security to the pilgrims during Annual Kailash
Mansarovar Yatra from 1981; and now Quarantine camp at Chhawala in New Delhi
during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Next, the Special Service Bureau (also abbreviated
SSB) was set up on 20 December 1963 following the Sino-Indian War of 1962 that
has later transformed into present SSB. To start with, the SSB primary role was
to provide armed support to the foreign intelligence division of Intelligence
Bureau, which later became Research and Analysis Wing (after its creation in
1968). Also, to merge with the local population and to inculcate feelings of
national belonging in the border population and assist them in developing their
capabilities for resistance through a continuous process of motivation and
training for guerilla warfare.
Pursuant to the recommendations of a group of
ministers on reforming the national security system, the SSB was declared as a
Border Guarding Force and Lead Intelligence Agency (LIA) for Indo-Nepal border
(June, 2001) and assigned the task of guarding the 1751 km long Indo-Nepal
border along the states of Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and
Sikkim. In March 2004, SSB was assigned the task of guarding the Indo-Bhutan
border along the states of Sikkim, West Bengal, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.
Now it is all over – Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Sikkim,
the border areas of Rajasthan and Gujarat, South Bengal, Jammu, the Nubra
Valley, Rajouri and the Poonch district of Jammu and Kashmir.
The multiple
roles assigned to the SSB today include: safeguard the security of assigned
borders of India and promote sense of security among the people living in
border areas; Prevent trans-border crimes, smuggling and any other illegal
activities; Prevent unauthorized entry into or exit from the territory of
India; Carry out civic action program; and perform any other duty assigned by
the Central Government (SSB is being deployed for Law & Order, Counter
Insurgency Operations and Election duty).
Supplementing the
primary role by superimposing secondary roles cumulatively has resulted in role
overload due to diversion and dilution of primary role. Consequently, instead
of creating command and control structures along the Indo-Tibet border, they
have been allowed to crop up all over India with focus on managing secondary
roles.
In sum, the
“Blind men of Hindustan” conceptually muddled through presiding over creating
“vast empires” with command and control hierarchy and training centers in
plains (few exceptions) and employed them on secondary roles which resulted
today in gaping voids on the Indo-Tibet borders.
Next, the growth of size of both the ITBP and SSB and
their employment needs review. The ITBP started with 4 battalions. Followed the
restructuring since 1978, the force has expanded to 60 Battalions; with a
sanctioned strength of 89,432 as of 2018. Its top hierarchy comprises 1 DGP, 15
IGPs and 40 DIG level officers. The DG, ITBP is located at Delhi with 2 Command
HQs headed by Additional DGPs each (Chandigarh and Guwahati), 5 Frontiers HQs
(Leh, Dehra Dun, Bhopal, Lucknow and Itanagar) and 15 Sector HQs besides 17
Training Centers and 07 logistics establishments.
So also, the
structure developed over the decades of the SSB. As of 2019, it has 94,261 active personnel in
73 battalions. The SSB organization
includes: DG Force HQs at Delhi; 06 Frontier HQs – 1) Ranikhet in 2014 for
Uttarkhand; 2) Lucknow in 2001 for Terrai region of UP; 3) Patna in 2006 for
riverine areas of Bihar; 4) Siliguri in 2011 for Bihar and West Bengal; 5)
Tezpur in 2015 for Assam and Arunachal; and, 6) Guwahati in 2004; and 18 Sector
HQs; and, 73 battalions including 02 Battalions converted into NDRF. The
location of some of the Sector HQs include: Delhi, Srinagar, Shimla, Lucknow, Bengaluru,
Patna, Bhubaneswar and Tezpur.
For example, the number of Headquarters at various
levels and training centers include: 2 DGP HQ at New Delhi, 2 Command HQs, 6+5
Frontier HQs, 15+18 Sector HQa and 17+10 training centers. Such a top heavy HQs
hierarchy to manage 60+73 battalions! What a phenomenal waste of scarce
financial resources! Instead, one could have raised another 60 battalions
providing the ‘Teeth’ to BSMS system.
High time to stop the proliferation of top heavy “Tail”!
Intellectual fraud it is to locate 17 ITBP training
centers, mostly in plains, to recruit, train and provide manpower support for a
force level of 60 battalions meant for high altitude operational tasks. How can
effective training be imparted for High Altitudes and Terrestrial Areas in
plains instead of mountains? Also,
manpower recruitment must be restricted to the local hill people for their
biological suitability and natural mountaineering skills as opposed to
plainsmen. Never too late to relocate the training centers of both ITBP and the
SSB places like Bomdilla, Gangtok in Sikkim, and other suitable locations in
Arunachal Pradesh or merged with those already existing in mountains.
A simple comparison with infantry regiments of the
army is enough to prove beyond any doubt about the avoidable extravaganza under
the Ministry of Home – one infantry regimental center for over 24 battalions. One
center in Ahmednagar caters to the manpower requirement of over 60 armor units.
Finally, there is
also need for a relook into the employment of the Assam Rifles. Prior to 1962 War, Assam Rifles was employed
not only in Nagaland and Manipur but also in North East Frontier Agency (Now
Arunachal Pradesh). Now, the roles of the Assam Rifles include: Guard the
Indo-Myanmar border; Conduct CI/CT operations in the North East; Aid to Civil
authorities; Undertake defensive operations and Rear Area Security during War;
and act as penultimate interventionist force in internal security situation,
under the control of army; when the situation goes beyond the control of CAPF.
There are
currently 46 battalions of Assam Rifles with a sanctioned strength of 63,747
personnel with hierarchical structure of DG (Shillong), 3 IG Headquarters, 12
Sector Headquarters, one Training Centre and
the administrative elements. Since their inception in 1947, Assam Rifles units commanded
and controlled by Army officers, and its troops are recruited from the NE
region, are ideally suited for employment on Arunachal Pradesh-Tibet Border as
opposed to the ITBP or SSB units.
Viewed in the
overall availability of 179 battalions (60 ITBF + 73 SSB + 46 AR) for BSMS,
that is, almost the component of infantry for 20 infantry divisions (@9
battalions per division), their designated employment on primary role of BSMS can
act as a deterrent to adversaries both during peace and war.
In retrospect,
the decision making authorities – Blind men of Hindustan – are squarely to be
blamed for assigning multiple secondary roles - plethora of them – and
designing classical linear hierarchical structures (empire building obsession),
locating training centers in plains, faulty recruiting processes and insulated water
tight functioning.
Now that there is emergency situation on the Indo-Tibet
borders, all the battalions of the ITBF, the SSB and the AR must be redeployed
in their primary role in “Hot war” locations – not in company driblets. Also,
strategic absurdity it is employ forces meant for employment in high altitudes
are redirected to conduct anti-Naxal operations in Chhattisgarh or Jharkhand
sans detailed knowledge of tribal customs, dialects and so on. Amit Shah must
order redeployment of 8 Battalions of ITBP employed in Chhattisgarh and 12
Battalions of SSB in J&K, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand and Assam to
Ladakh.
My earnest appeal to the “Blind men of Hindustan” is
to recognize that modernization through downsizing by integration – based on
suitability and appropriateness for each theatre based on ‘span of control’
principles is an imperative. Meanwhile, merger of ITBP and SSB into one
organization will reduce the “Top and Tail Structures” by half as the first
initiative. Since the ITBP, the SSB and the AR units are placed under
operational command of army formations during war, the intervening “Frontier
and Sector HQs” are redundant. Naturally, they must function under the Ministry
of Defense.
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