Ground Report - Agnipath Riots; Not Protests

The eruption of riots over the announcement of 'Agnipath Scheme' and the controversy razing in public domain made me to undertake study of the reasons at the 'Ground Level".

So far, my findings are simple. India today in mid-2022 is no more the same as India of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and even 1980s. Mind Boggling transformations have taken place - from Agricultural Age to Industrial Age to Technology Age Civilization particularly information and digital technologies.

In the realm of warfare, all alike must also accept that transformations in warfare are from Gen 1 to Gen 4 warfare to "Full Spectrum Operations and Hybrid Warfare. Stealth fighter jets, tanks, aircraft carriers, nuclear bombs and missiles are the technologies that have changed the face of warfare. Now, the world is almost at the cusp of another transformation that could redefine military strength: artificial intelligence, Cyber systems and the Unarmed Aerial Combat Vehicle systems (UACVs).

In reality, even until the 1980s, the Indian combat systems technologies particularly in fighting arms were mostly Generation 2 systems. Thus, the minimum eligibility standards prescribed remained mostly that were inherited from post-World War II requirements. Nonetheless, recruit training duration and syllabi has almost remained static even after 72 years except for few refinements. What is more disturbing is the average age has gone up to 32 years, which is unacceptable for fighting arms soldiers.

All alike must realize that high-tech changes of the current combat weapons systems have transformed from Generation 2 to Generation 4 or 4++. Yet, the irrefutable fact is technology innovation of combat systems is a mirage in India except in few systems.

And, China, India's main adversary is racing ahead of the USA in technology power competition. And, the PLA has implemented modernization by downsizing and constituting Joint Integrated Theatre commands starting in 2015 and also their recruiting systems.

My earnest pleas to all Veteran or self styled political and academic critics of the Agnipath scheme is simple. Please stop persisting with "Destructive Criticism" per se. Remember Veterans too must, that there is no alternative to ensure Young-age soldier-cum-high-tech mix at optimum costs which implies total revamp of the existing "Recruiting System" which is inherited British Indian Army legacy system. Therefore, the need of the hour for all the critics of the "Agnipath" initiative is to offer 'Constructive or Creative criticism" based on the needs of future warfare.

Let me highlight, the Indian social environment has dramatically progressed from 1950 to 2022. Changes in key fundamentals - population and literacy levels - includes: In 1951, India's population was 36.1 crores with literacy rate as 27.16%; in 1961 with 43.9 crores and literacy rate of 40.4%; and in 1971 with 54.8 crores and literacy rate of 45.96%. Barely 7 crores available for all types of jobs in 1951. By exception only (Nursing), girls were entering armed forces.

As per World-o-meter as on June 23, 2022, India's population was 140.6 crores with literacy at 79% with Kerala over 93%. Over 112 crores literates seeking employment. Girls are seeking admission into NDA and IMA dreaming to become fighter pilots and talk of other combat jobs.

Next, the most significant factor that needs to be highlighted is the mushrooming of "Placement Defense Academy's/Coaching Centers" at All India level. On a ground check in Hyderabad with regard to the number of "Placement Defense Academy's/Coaching Centers", their numbers came as a pleasant surprise. In retrospect, facts concerning their growth status in the past 72-years is given below:

· Fact 1 - No "Placement Defense Academy's/Coaching Centers" in 1950s, 1960s and even 1970s in Telangana/Andhra Pradesh except few of them in places like Delhi, Chandigarh, Patna etc. That too for those candidates to prepare for NDA or IMA Entrance Examinations.

· Fact 2 - Growth of placement institutes for soldiers, sailors and airmen is a later phenomenon commencing in late 1970s.

· Fact 3 - Over 40 "Placement Defense Academy's/Coaching Centers" located in Hyderabad GHMC region alone. Add to them, a number of such institutions also in 33 districts of Telangana.

· Fact 4 - No official registration based on "rules". Some of them are part of large "Junior College Campuses" with full fledged staff and many others are in localities based on small open grounds with few trainers.

· Fact 5 - Such institutes are run mostly by Ex-Servicemen. Some of them have close links with Branch Recruiting officials responsible for recruitment rally's.

· Fact 6 - Besides Physical fitness training to enable students to qualify minimum recruiting standards and coaching to appear in the written tests, some of them impart arms training also.

· Fact 7 - For Jawan's enrolment today, the fees vary from Rs.5000/- to 30,000/-.

As per news in the public domain in Bihar alone, there are over 600 such institutes. Extrapolating the overall numbers of such institutes at All India level may well be over 1500 to 2000.

As per ground reports, the pan-India riots broke out due to instigation mostly by the "Placement Defense Academy's/Coaching Centers". The reason is simple. After 2020, business turnovers of a large number of such institutes suddenly dipped to near "Zero" levels. Even those candidates, who were enrolled in a large number of "Placement Defense Academy's/Coaching Centers" and paid fees, were left 'high and dry'. Both the organizers of the institutes and their wards were denied employment opportunities. The "Agnipath" scheme became the "casus belli" for pan-India riots.

In retrospect, the blame squarely rests on successive governments for their failure to periodically implement reforms to the "Recruitment System and Induction Training Syllabi". Instead, the politico-bureaucratic policy and decision makers only indulged in the "Top-Down" approach. From time to time, they constituted a plethora of Committees and Task Forces that dealt with the various security planning, decision-making, procurement and reforms issues to include: 1) 1975–76 - Experts Committee headed by Lt. Gen K Krishna Rao on re-organization and modernization for future defense of the country; 2) 1983 - Arun Singh Committee on Defence Expenditure; 3) 1989-1990 - K C Pant Committee on the NSC; 4) 1992 - Abdul Kalam Committee on Self-reliance in Weapons Acquisition; 5) 1999 - Kargil Review Committee (KRC) headed by the late K. Subrahmanyam; 6) 2000-2001 - Task forces on Higher Defence Management, Border Management, Internal Security and Intelligence: 7) P. Rama Rao Committee on restructuring the DRDO; 8) 2008-2009- Vinod Misra Defence Expenditure Review Committee; 9) 2011 - Task Force on National Security headed by former Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador to the US Naresh Chandra, and comprised 13 other members; 10) 2011-2012 - Ravindra Gupta Committee on Defence Modernization and Self-reliance; 11) 2015 - Dhirendra Singh Committee on Defence Procurement; 12) 2016 - Shekatker Committee to Enhance Combat Capability and Rebalance Defence Expenditure; 13) Vijay Kelkar The 10th Finance Commission; 14) Standing Committee(s) on Defence in Parliament; and, Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). Other task forces include: 1) Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus headed by G.C. Saxena; 2) Task Force on Internal Security headed by N.N. Vohra; 3) Task Force on Border Management headed by Dr Madhav Godbole; and 4) Task Force on Management of Defence headed by Arun Singh.

All of them failed to address the "Recruitment System and Induction Training". More importantly, they failed to take decisions on the demand of the forces to implement "Lateral Induction" of ex-servicemen into other government organizations. Had they attempted "Bottoms-Up", they would have prevented today's fiasco. In particular, enacted the Parliament Act mandating "Lateral Induction" of all ex-soldiers mandatory in all government organizations based on their qualifications and skills.

Few of the key issues that needs to be addressed to identify reforms in "Recruitment System and Induction Training Syllabi" in the face current social scenario are as given below:

· Single uniform prescription cannot meet the requirements of combat or fighting arms - infantry, armor, artillery (non missile units) and combat engineers - technical services like MES engineers, EME and AMC and services like ASC, AOC and others.

· Minimum educational qualifications be revised from Class X to Class XII for combat arms. For technical services, educational qualifications are specified as ITI qualified after 2-year long technical skill development courses with Class X. Engineering Diploma holders can be treated for JCOs direct commission.

· Based on the above, minimum age requirements be reviewed de novo and defined.

· Even the Health and Physical Fitness requirements need de novo review and determination considering that candidates undergo pre-entrance training and coaching in placement institutes.

More importantly, all "Placement Institutes/Centers" be treated as assets by regulating and registering them based on criteria of minimum standards of training, infrastructure and staff.

Next, if the educational qualification for candidates for infantry General Duty Soldiers is Class 10 only, then their age requirements be refixed as 16-20 instead of 17 1/2 to 21. Alternatively, the educational qualification be revised as Class 12 and age retained as 17 1/2 to 21. Today, even the infantry units have high-tech combat systems to operate during war. Furthermore, the minimum qualifying marks average should be revised as 50 with Maths, Physics and Chemistry as subjects. Their physical and medical qualifying standards must be up-scaled so that only the toughest and fittest are recruited ab initio. In particular, their BP must be below 120/80 considered most suitable for High Altitude and Mountain warfare.

Taking advantage of inducting technically qualified ITI students will eliminate the need for in-house course training in Recruit Training Centers. By doing so, "Induction training period and syllabi" of recruits in training centers - combat arms, technical services and logistics units - can be dramatically optimized. There are a range of ITI courses for class 10 pass candidates varying from 1 to 3 years. For example, 2-year Information Technology and E.S.M. Engineering, 2-year Draughtsman Civil Engineering, one year course of Motor Mechanic and Driving, 2-year Turner Engineering, 2-year Fitter Engineering etc. They must be given priority for entry into technical arms like Engineers, Signals and EME. Even their age requirements are reviewed and fixed as 18 to 21. Each technical arm must be consulted prior to specifying minimum requirements.

Yet another feature that needs review and reforms is the merger of training establishments in the Indian Army - Category “A” and Category “B” establishments. Category “A” establishments are:

• Army Training. The training schools/colleges/establishments of Army Air Defence, Army Aviation, Armored Corps, Combat Army Aviation Training School (CAATS), Infantry, Artillery and Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School, High Altitude Warfare School, Junior Leader Wing, Special Forces Training School.

• All Arms Training. Army Education Corps Training Centre and College, Army Institute of Physical Training, AWC, Junior Leader Academy, Military Intelligence School, NCO Academy, Institute of Military Law and Institute of National Integration.

• Services Training. Army Medical College & Centre (Armed Forces Medical College is a Joint Services Organization), Army Service Corps College, College of Modern Management, Corps of Military Police School, Remount and Veterinary College.

• Technical Training. College of Military Engineering (CME), Electrical and Mechanical Engineers School, Military College of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (MCEME) and Military College of Telecommunication Engineers (MCTE).

• Pre-Commission Training. Indian Military Academy (IMA), Officer Training Academy (OTA), Gaya and Chennai.

· Category “B” establishments. Primarily regimental training centers where recruits are trained. They provide limited training to JCOs and NCOs as well.

For example, Higher Command and Junior Command Courses for the infantry, armor and artillery can be merged and grouped under one head - All Arms Tactical Courses in a single institution. It, therefore, goes without saying that in-house and in-depth de novo comprehensive and holistic review of reforms is considered an imperative to optimize and ensure effective implementation.

The controversial issues that need to be addressed of the Agnipath initiative are the 4-year duration and 25% retention. Even today, a number of soldiers seek discharge due to various compassionate reasons in the early stages of their service. Also, some of them are medically categorized as permanent low medical category fit only for sedentary duties. Based on detailed in-house studies, the scope to increase duration to 6-7 years and 50% retention screening needs to be examined.

Finally, the major shortcoming of the "Agnipath" initiative is its "blind-eye" towards making up for the shortfalls in officers. As per information available in public domain, the shortage is 7,791 officers in the Indian Army alone followed by 1,557 in the Indian Navy and 572 in the IAF. Most critical is filling of Officers vacancies particularly in the fighting Arms. Also, a reserve pool of fighter pilots.

In particular, the shortage of the infantry battalions is nearly 50% - only 11 officers including low medical category officers instead of 20. Young officers, the front line leaders, are at a premium. Based on experiences of past wars including Kargil War, it is the young officers in combat arms who lead from the front to capture ground and kill adversaries and bear the burnt. All permanent low medical categories officers attributable to harsh service conditions must be given avenues to seek entry into Civil Services through qualifying in competitive examinations like the precedent set after the 1965 war.

To sum up, what is needed to undertake a time bound "Bottoms Up" approach from unit levels to identify reforms to ensure man-weapon technology-cum-warfare mix. Not per se destructive criticism, which is largely political, for retaining the status quo ante. If the need is to reduce the pension bill, the axe must fall first on over 5,00,000 civilians employed in the Armed Forces - a separate issue.

Article by Shri G B Reddy Sir